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Investor regret: The role of expectation in comparing what is to
what might have been
Wen-Hsien Huang⇤ Marcel Zeelenberg†
Abstract
Investors, like any decision maker, feel regret when they compare the outcome of an investment with what the outcome
would have been had they invested differently. We argue and show that this counterfactual comparison process is most
likely to take place when the decision maker’s expectations are violated. Across five scenario experiments we found
that decision makers were influenced only by forgone investment outcomes when the realized investment fell short of
the expected result. However, when their investments exceeded prior expectations, the effect of foregone investment
on regret disappeared. In addition, Experiment 4 found that individual differences in the need to maximize further
moderated the effects of their expectations, such that maximizers always take into account the forgone investment. The
final experiment found that when probed to make counterfactual comparisons, also investments that exceed expectations
may lead to regret. Together these experiments reveal insights into the comparative processes leading to decision regret.
Keywords: regret, expectation, disappointment, counterfactual thinking, maximization.
1 Introduction
Regret is a negative emotion that most of us are famil-
iar with. It is a highly relevant emotion in the con-
text of decision making and has been widely studied
by psychologists, economists and consumer behavior re-
searchers. Regret is an unpleasant feeling, associated
with the wish to undo the regretted event, a strong ten-
dency to metaphorically kick oneself and wanting to get
a second chance (Zeelenberg et al., 1998a). This makes
regret uniquely linked to decisions made and it has been
shown to be a powerful predictor of behavior. Zeelenberg
and Pieters (2006, 2007, 2008) summarized the scattered
findings and theories concerning regret and its impact on
decision making and proposed an integrative theory of
regret regulation (see also, Inman, 2007; Pieters & Zee-
lenberg, 2007; Roese et al., 2007). In their proposition 2
(p. 6), they state that “Regret is a comparison-based emo-
tion of self-blame, experienced when people realize or
imagine that their present situation would have been bet-
ter had they decided differently in the past.” An investor
who thinks, for example, “If only I had bought Google
stock, I would have earned much more” feels regret. The
theory of regret regulation was developed to understand
how consumers deal with regret and it proposes strategies
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used to regulate it (for recent research examining regret
regulation see, Morrison & Roese, 2011; Västfjäll et al.,
2011). To fully understand the impact of regret, it is im-
portant to further develop insights into the psychology of
this emotion and the processes that may moderate it. We
discuss here how prior expectations about the outcomes
of decisions can play such a moderating role.
Let us start with the fact that regret is a counterfac-
tual emotion (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Roese & Olson,
1997; Zeelenberg & Van Dijk, 2005). To feel regret, one
needs to run a mental simulation of what happened and
what could have happened instead, then compare the two.
Hence, the forgone outcome becomes the reference point
against which regret is computed. This is how regret has
been conceptualized in the early economic regret theories
(Bell, 1985; Loomes & Sugden, 1987) and has also been
well established empirically (e.g., Mandel, 2003; Zeelen-
berg et al., 1998b; Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2005). This
comparing of decision outcomes in regret (and in rejoic-
ing) may by itself be consequential, as the comparative
mind-set may actually carry-over to subsequent decisions
(Raeva et al., 2011).
Interestingly, Lin, Huang, and Zeelenberg (2006)
found that the experience of regret can also be affected
by other standards of comparison. That research revealed
that not only counterfactual comparisons feed into regret,
but also comparisons of the obtained outcome with prior
held expectations. Through an online survey, they in-
terviewed 227 stock investors from a security company.
These investors answered several questions concerning
their chosen and forgone investments. The results showed
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that forgone outcomes (of considered but non-chosen in-
vestments) indeed influenced the intensity of the regret
felt over their investment. But, and this is relevant here,
the a-priori expectations concerning the chosen invest-
ment were also significantly related to the regret these
investors felt over their financial decisions. The larger
the difference between the return on investment and these
expectations, the more intense the regret. Huang and
Tseng (2007) found similar effects in an experimental
field study with 372 managers.
Comparisons of obtained outcomes to prior held ex-
pectancies have been linked in the literature to the emo-
tional response of disappointment (Marcatto & Ferrante,
2008; Mellers et al., 1997; Van Dijk & Van der Pligt,
1997; Van Dijk et al., 1999), but not yet to regret (with the
exception of Lin et al., 2006 and Huang & Tseng, 2007).
This is interesting because regret and disappointment are
in many ways related, though clearly distinct emotions,
that both serve a role in decision making (Zeelenberg et
al., 1998a). Ample research, also reviewed in Zeelenberg
and Pieters (2007; p. 6–7), and their proposition 3 (p. 7)
reads “Regret is distinct from related other specific emo-
tions such as anger, disappointment, envy, guilt, sadness
and shame, and from general negative affect on the ba-
sis of its appraisals, experiential content and behavioral
consequences.” It may well be the case that regret re-
sembles disappointment in the sense that the experience
is sensitive to expectancy violations. Whether both emo-
tions respond similarly to comparisons with expectations
and with forgone alternatives will be examined in Exper-
iment 5.
These two studies (Huang & Tseng, 2007; Lin et al.,
2006) are, to the best of our knowledge, the first to high-
light the fact that expectations may impact feelings of
regret, but note that this research remains mute with re-
spect to the underlying psychological processes. Also,
the data collected in these studies were primarily cor-
relational, precluding strong causal conclusions. In the
present study we thus take stock of the apparent discrep-
ancy between the findings of Huang and Tseng and Lin
et al. and the prior work on regret. To do this, we investi-
gate experimentally the impact of expected outcomes and
violations of these expectancies on investor regret (and
disappointment), in hope to shed some light on the psy-
chological processes involved. Five experiments are used
to expand our understanding of the comparison processes
that instigates post-decisional investment regret.
1.1 Expectation violation as a moderator
An expectation is an “anticipation of future consequences
based on prior experience, current circumstances, or other
sources of information” (Oliver, 1996, p.68). Expecta-
tions play a role in many different psychological pro-
cesses, including comparisons (Ritov, 2000). Theoretical
models of comparisons sometimes include a surprising-
ness weight (i.e., a measure of expectancy disconfirma-
tion) that augments the emotional reaction to the compar-
ison (e.g., Mellers et al., 1997; Ritov, 2000). Empirically,
self-derived expectations can act as a reference point in
the evaluation of outcomes (e.g., Cherry et al., 2003;
Oliver, 1996; Ordóñez et al., 2000). Bridges (1993), for
example, indicated that consumers’ expectations regard-
ing a product or service selected for a particular situa-
tion may determine a reference point that affects how they
judge the products or services they plan to use in that sit-
uation.
Indeed, decision makers usually have some expecta-
tions as to how likely the different outcomes are. In-
vestors, for example, may invest in a stock because they
predict (and expect and hope) that it will go up in price,
and thus that it will perform well. Oliver (1996) sug-
gested that investors use this price expectation as a ba-
sis for comparing performance outcomes. An interesting
question is: What happens when the obtained outcome
performs better than the expectation, but worse than a for-
gone outcome? Or more specifically for our current pur-
poses, what happens to regret when two reference points
(the counterfactual outcome and the expected outcome)
produce different and conflicting evaluations? The cur-
rent literature remains mute with respect to this question.
The tradeoff between using these two reference points to
evaluate an obtained outcome may determine the over-
all regret experienced by the decision maker. We assume
that, in the case of regret, expectation will serve as a mod-
erator influencing the impact of the better-forgone out-
come on the experience of regret. When the obtained
outcome exceeds the expectation, the investor will be sat-
isfied (Oliver, 1996) and he or she will not engage much
further in comparisons of the obtained outcome with po-
tential alternatives. The decision maker will thus feel less
regret about an unfavorable investment (the obtained out-
come is worse than the forgone one) that is above ex-
pectations than when that same outcome would fall be-
low expectations. Put differently, we expect investors to
be most sensitive to forgone outcomes when the obtained
outcome negatively violates their expectations.
This reasoning is consistent with two studies that ex-
amined how expectation affects counterfactual thinking.
First, Sanna and Turley (1996) found that expectancy vio-
lations influence the number of spontaneously generated
counterfactual thoughts. In their Study 2, for example,
they assessed the generation of counterfactuals after stu-
dents’ real-life exam performances. The results indicated
that more counterfactual thoughts were generated after
unexpected than expected outcomes, particularly unex-
pected failures. Conversely, when outcomes went as ex-
pected, people were less motivated to generate counter-
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factuals and to think through the consequences of what
could have been which may in turn prevent them from
experiencing regret.
Second, McGraw, Mellers, and Tetlock (2005) demon-
strated the powerful effects of expectation-based coun-
terfactuals on happiness. In their Study 1, McGraw et
al. used television footage of the 2000 Olympics. They
found that athletes compared their achievements to their
expectations, and these comparisons influenced their hap-
piness. Bronze medalists who had not expected to receive
a medal were happier than silver medalists that initially
expected gold. McGraw et al. also showed that their hap-
piness was more influenced by expectation-based coun-
terfactuals than by category-based counterfactuals (e.g.,
silver medalists make upward comparisons and bronze
medalists make downward comparisons).
In brief, Sanna and Turley (1996) and McGraw et al.’s
(2005) studies clearly suggest that the tendency to gener-
ate counterfactuals is influenced by expectation, such that
outcomes below expectation induce counterfactual think-
ing and produce regret.
Based on the research reviewed above, we expect to
find that, when the obtained outcomes exceed the ex-
pected outcome, decision makers will feel less regret
about a possible better alternative. That is, outcomes
that exceed prior expectations may buffer against regret.
However, when the obtained outcomes fail to meet prior
expectations, decision makers will suffer from regret: the
counterfactual investment simply hurts more.
There is also the case in which prior expectations are
unknown or absent, when we have not given it much
thought. We believe that in these cases investors are also
motivated to inspect the forgone outcomes (the unchosen
investments) because they need this information to evalu-
ate the obtained outcome. Put differently, we expect that
expectation, or maybe more precise, expectation viola-
tion, will statistically moderate the effect of alternative
outcomes (counterfactuals) on the experience of regret.
This would be the case because, in situations in which
investors prior expectations are outperformed, investors
are not motivated to find out what would have happened
otherwise.
2 Experiment 1
In Experiment 1 we put this reasoning to a first test. Sub-
jects read that they had invested in a European Fund. All
were informed that their obtained outcomes were worse
than the counterfactual ones provided by the unchosen in-
vestment (a prerequisite for regret). Some subjects read
that the obtained outcome was higher than they initially
expected (Above Expectation condition). Others read that
the obtained outcome was worse than expected (Below
Expectation condition). We also included a condition in
which no expectation information was presented (Con-
trol condition). We expected regret to be lowest when the
obtained outcome was above expectations, indicating the
buffering effect of exceeding expectations.
2.1 Method
Seventy-two on-the-job business students at a large uni-
versity in Taiwan (32 males, 40 females, Mage = 27, SD
= 4.01) received course credit for their participation. On-
the-job graduate students were recruited for all our ex-
periments because they had personal experience in in-
vestment decisions similar to the one described in our
studies. They were randomly assigned to one of three
conditions (Above Expectation, Below Expectation, and
Control), with 24 subjects per condition. The scenario for
the Above [Below] Expectation condition ran as follows
(all scenarios were originally in Mandarin Chinese):
After several years of hard work, you fi-
nally have NT$1,000,000 in your bank account.
You wish to invest this money in order to earn
more. As the interest on a savings deposit ac-
count is low and the risk of stock investment is
high, you consider investing NT$1,000,000 in
the fund market. After narrowing the search,
you consider two funds: European Funds A
and B and decide to invest in Fund A. You
expect Fund A to earn a profit of NT$50,000
[NT$150,000] after one year.
NOW, ONE YEAR LATER. . .
You have held Fund A investments for over
one year and you plan to sell today. After
selling you find that Fund A has earned you
NT$100,000, which is better [worse] than your
expectations. However, you also find that you
could have earned NT$200,000 if only you had
invested the Fund B.
Subjects in the control condition did not read about the
expected profit and were confronted only with the ob-
tained and forgone outcome. After having read the sce-
nario, subjects indicated how much regret they would feel
with one item: “I regret choosing Fund A” (1 = strongly
disagree; 7 = strongly agree).
2.2 Results and discussion
The results are shown in Figure 1. One-way ANOVA
testing yielded a significant effect (Mabove = 2.92, SD =
1.41; Mbelow = 3.96, SD = 1.20; Mcontrol = 4.46, SD =
1.28), F (2, 69) = 8.78, p < .001. Posthoc Tukey HSD
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testing showed that regret in the Above Expectation con-
dition was significantly lower than in the Below Expec-
tation condition (p < .05), and in the Control condition
(p < .001). However, regret in the Below Expectation
condition was not significantly different from the Control
condition (p = .38).1 These findings corroborate the rea-
soning that expectation statistically moderates the effect
of the forgone outcome on the experienced regret. When
the obtained outcome is higher than the expectation, de-
cision makers feel less regret about their unfavorable out-
come than when that outcome is below their expectation
or when there were no initial expectations.
3 Experiment 2
We continued by testing our hypothesis in the context of
losses. Losses are conceptually similar, but not identical
to forgone gains. We expect somewhat more intense re-
gret ratings than in Experiment 1, since losses loom larger
than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and negative
outcomes evoke more counterfactual thinking than pos-
itive outcomes (Roese & Olson, 1997). However, con-
cerning the differences between the conditions we expect
to replicate Experiment 1.
1Readers may wonder if these results only hold for the one-item
scale directly asking about regret, or also for the multi-item scale.
Hence, we also tested our hypothesis using two-item regret that were
borrowed from Lin et al. (2006) and Tsiros and Mittal (2000): “I re-
gret choosing Fund A” and “I feel sorry for choosing Fund A”, and the
same results were confirmed. The ANOVA on the two-item regret yield
a significant main effect (Mabove = 3.02, SD = 1.40; Mbelow = 3.94, SD
= 1.18; Mcontrol = 4.42, SD = 1.27), F (2, 69) = 7.29, p < .001. Post hoc
tests showed significant differences between the conditions Above ver-
sus Below (p < .05) and Above versus Control (p < .001), but not Below
versus Control (p = .41). We will provide these two-item analyses also
for experiments 2–4.



















One hundred and twenty Taiwanese on-job business stu-
dents (44 males, 76 females, Mage = 30.4, SD = 5.43)
received course credit for their participation. They were
randomly assigned to one of three conditions (40 per con-
dition). Subjects read the same scenario and regret ques-
tion as in Experiment 1, but now the scenario ended as
follows:
You have held Fund A investments over
one year. You plan to sell it today. Dur-
ing this past year, the international oil price
has remained high, there have been terrorist at-
tacks and a sharp plunge in the global economy.
Based on news report, you expect you may lose
NT$200,000 [NT$120,000]. After selling, you
find that Fund A has lost NT$160,000 of its
value, which is better [worse] than your ex-
pected loss. However, you also find that you
would have lost only NT$100,000 if only you
had invested in Fund B.
Subjects in the control condition did not read about the
expectation information and were confronted only with
the obtained outcome (a loss of NT$160,000) and forgone
outcome (a loss of NT$100,000).
3.2 Results and discussion
The results are shown in Figure 2. They clearly replicate
the findings of Experiment 1. One-way ANOVA testing
yielded a significant effect (Mabove = 4.13, SD = 1.45;
Mbelow = 5.43, SD = 1.17; Mcontrol = 5.05, SD = 1.13),
F (2, 117) = 11.26, p < .001. Tukey HSD testing showed
that regret in the Above Expectation condition was sig-
nificantly lower than that in the Below Expectation con-
dition (p < .001), and in the Control condition (p < .01).
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However, the regret in the Below Expectation condition
did not differ from that in the Control condition (p = .38).2
4 Experiment 3
Here we further investigated the impact of expectation on
regret by testing the effect of the difference in size be-
tween the obtained and the alternative outcome. This ma-
nipulation should influence the intensity of regret, as this
emotion is a reflection of this difference. However, on
the basis of our theorized assumption and Experiments 1
and 2, we predict that this manipulation will affect regret
only when the obtained outcome is below the prior held
expectation.
4.1 Method
One hundred and eight Taiwanese on-job business stu-
dents (28 males, 76 females, Mage = 28.7, SD = 3.92)
received course credit for their participation. They were
randomly assigned to one of four conditions of the fol-
lowing 2 (Expectation: Above vs. Below) × 2 (Forgone
Gain: Small vs. Large) design. There were 26 subjects
per condition. The scenario and regret question were the
same as in Experiment 1, with in the Large Forgone con-
ditions a counterfactual outcome of NT$400,000.
4.2 Results and discussion
The results are shown in Figure 3. A 2 (Expectation) ×
2 (Forgone gain) ANOVA on the regret ratings yielded
significant main effects of Expectation (Mabove = 3.71 vs.
Mbelow = 4.56, F (1, 100) = 11.67, p < .001) and Forgone
gain (Msmall = 3.87 vs. Mlarge = 4.40, F (1, 100) = 4.73, p <
.05), such that outcomes below the expectation as well as
large forgone gain resulted in more intense regret. As pre-
dicted, the analysis also yielded a significant interaction,
F (1, 100) = 4.08, p < .05, such that when the obtained
outcome was below expectations, regret was higher in the
Large Forgone gain condition (M = 5.08, SD = .89) than
the Small Forgone gain condition (M = 4.04, SD = 1.37),
t (50) = -3.24, p < .01. Contrarily, when the obtained out-
come was above expectation, regret was lower and there
was no effect of Forgone gain (Msmall = 3.69, SD = 1.32;
Mlarge = 3.73, SD = 1.40, t (50) = -.10, p = .92). These
findings again corroborate the reasoning that expectation
2ANOVA demonstrated a similar main effect on the two item regret
scale, F (2, 117) = 8.51, p < .001. For the Above, Below, and Control
conditions, the regret ratings were 4.25 (SD = 1.41), 5.34 (SD = 1.04),
and 4.84 (SD = 1.05), respectively. Post hoc tests revealed that the dif-
ferences were between Above versus Below conditions (p < .001) as
well as Above versus Control conditions (p = .07). No difference was
found between Below and Control conditions (p = .15).





















serves as a moderator to influence the effect of the better-
forgone outcome on experiencing regret.3
5 Experiment 4
Experiments 1 to 3 supported the idea that decision mak-
ers feel less regret when their outcomes outperform their
expectations, if, in that case, they do not engage in com-
parisons with forgone investments. Nevertheless, some
people are more likely to make counterfactual compar-
isons than others, and they may also do this when the out-
comes are better than expected. Schwartz, Ward, Mon-
terosso, Lyubomirsky, White and Lehman (2002) have
argued that some people are more than others likely to
engage in seeking the “best”. They refer to this tendency
as maximization. They constructed a reliable and val-
idated Maximization scale for measuring these individ-
ual differences in the orientation to maximize, and allow
for the opportunity to classify people as maximizers or
satisficers. The satisficer is looking for something that
crosses the threshold of acceptability—something that is
good enough; the maximizer is looking for the best out-
come. Previous research has shown that maximization is
related to trait regret or regret proneness (Schwartz et al.,
2002; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007), but it has not yet been
applied to experience of regret as a state.
3The analysis of the two-item regret measure produced similar re-
sults. There were two main effects (Expectation: Mabove = 3.57 vs.
Mbelow = 4.47, F (1, 100) = 17.11, p < .001; Forgone gain: Msmall =
3.77 vs. Mlarge = 4.27, F (1, 100) = 5.24, p < .05) and an interaction
between the Expectation and Forgone gain, F (1, 100) = 4.10, p < .05.
When the outcome was Below expectations, subjects reported higher
level of regret in the Large Forgone condition than in the Small Forgone
gain condition (Msmall =4.00, SD = 1.22 vs. Mlarge = 4.94, SD = .73, t
(50) = -3.39, p < .001). In contrast, no difference was found for sub-
jects in the Above expectation condition (Msmall = 3.54, SD = 1.28 vs.
Mlarge = 3.60, SD = 1.15, t (50) = -.17, p = .87).
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In Experiment 4, we used this insight about individ-
ual differences in the tendency to maximize to further ex-
plore the influence of expectation on regret in the context
of social comparison (i.e., the better-performing forgone
outcome was obtained by a friend). We propose that the
effect of expectation would be moderated by individual
differences in maximization, such that satisficers would
be less influenced by the better-performing forgone out-
comes. With “good enough” rather than the “best” as a
criterion, satisficers should be less inclined to experience
regret. However, since maximizers desire the best possi-
ble results, when they realize that their outcomes would
have been better, they will suffer strongly from regret,
regardless of the level of expectation. Lastly, regret will
not be significantly different between satisficers and max-
imizers when expectation information is unknown (the
better-performing forgone outcomes serve as the only ref-
erence point).
5.1 Method
One hundred and five on-job Taiwanese business students
(42 males, 63 females, Mage = 29.6, SD = 5.01) received
course credit for their participation. They filled in the
13-item Maximization Scale (↵ = .77) (Schwartz et al.,
2002). The items were combined and averaged to pro-
vide a single composite score, ranging from 2 to 6.6, with
a median of 4.2 on the 7-point scale. We then performed
a median split on the maximizing scale. We refer to stu-
dents whose score fell above the median as maximizers
(n = 52); and those whose score fell below the median as
satisficers (n = 53).
The subjects were randomly assigned to one of three
conditions (Expectation: Above vs. Below vs. Control),
with 35 subjects per condition. The scenario in the Above
[Below] Expectation condition read as follows:
After several years hard work, you finally
have NT$1,000,000 in your bank account. You
wish to invest this money in order to earn more.
As the interest of a savings deposit account is
low and the risk of stock investment is high,
you consider investing NT$1,000,000 in the
fund market. After narrowing the search, you
consider two funds: European Funds A and
B. You decide to invest in Fund A. One of
your friends also invests NT$1,000,000 but he
invests in European Fund B. You expect that
Fund A will earn you a profit of NT$90,000
[NT$150,000] after one year.
NOW, ONE YEAR LATER. . .
You have held investments in Fund A for
over one year and you plan to sell today. After
selling, you find that Fund A has earned you
NT$120,000, which is better [worse] than your
expectation. However, you also note that your
friend earned NT$180,000 when he sold Fund
B on the same day.
Subjects in the control condition did not read about the
expectation information and were only confronted with
their own obtained profit and that obtained by their friend.
After this, subjects responded to our regret question.
5.2 Results and discussion
The results are shown in Figure 4. A 3 (Expectation:
Above vs. Below vs. Control) × 2 (Maximizers vs. Satis-
ficers) ANOVA on the regret ratings yielded a significant
main effect of expectation, F (2, 99) = 3.26, p < .05, a
significant main effect of maximizing orientation, F (1,
99) = 7.11, p < .01. In agreement with our main hypothe-
sis, these two main effects were qualified by a significant
interaction, F (2, 99) = 3.31, p < .05.4
Simple main effects analysis revealed that the differ-
ence in the means between the three conditions for the
Maximizers were not significant (Mabove = 4.43, SD =
1.16; Mbelow = 4.35, SD = 1.27; Mcontrol = 4.47, SD =
.74), F (2, 49) = .06, p = .95. That is, Maximizers gave
high regret ratings regardless of the levels of expectation.
For Satisficers, the simple main effects analysis indicated
that regret was significantly lower when the unfavorable
outcomes were above expectations (M = 2.86, SD = 1.24)
than below expectations (M = 4.08, SD = 1.31) or expec-
tations unknown (M = 4.30, SD = 1.53), F (2, 50) = 6.37,
p < .01. Consistent with our reasoning, Satisficers re-
ported less regret when their unfavorable outcomes were
higher than expectations than lower than expectations or
expectations unknown.5
These findings corroborate the view that social com-
parison processes may add to regret (Boles & Messick,
1995; Huang & Tseng, 2007; Larrick, 1993; Van Dijk
& Zeelenberg, 2005; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004, 2007).
Beyond this corroboration, our findings are of special im-
portance because they support the notion that personality
plays an important role in the selection and use of ref-
erence points. In particular, we conclude that the effect
of expectation on regret (that we revealed in the previ-
ous three experiments) was mainly derived from satisfi-
cers. When the obtained unfavorable outcome was higher
4The interaction remained significant, at p < .01, using a continuous
measure of maximization.
5The analysis of the two-item regret scale also resulted in a signif-
icant interaction effect, F (2, 99) = 3.36, p < .05. For Maximizers, the
regret ratings were not significant between the Above, Below, and Con-
trol conditions, F (2, 49) = .23, p = .79 (Mabove = 4.29, SD = .96; Mbelow
= 4.50, SD = 1.11; Mcontrol = 4.37, SD = .67). For Satisficers, the regret
differences were significant between conditions Above versus Below
and Above versus Control, F (2, 50) = 7.53, p < .001 (Mabove = 2.86,
SD = 1.14; Mbelow = 3.83, SD = 1.27; Mcontrol = 4.33, SD = 1.29).
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Figure 4: Results of Experiment 4.
 



















than expectation, satisficers viewed this outcome as good
enough and were less likely to compare the actual out-
come with the imagined outcome that might have oc-
curred, and thus kept them from the negative feelings of
regret. Expectation had no effect for maximizers, because
they were inclined to pursue the best results. They thus
suffered from a high level of post-decisional regret when
they encountered a better-performing forgone outcome.
6 Experiment 5
The previous experiments were consistent with the idea
that decision makers feel less regret when their outcomes
outperform their expectations because they do not engage
in counterfactual comparisons with forgone investments.
In Experiment 4 we found that maximizers’ regret is al-
ways amplified when the counterfactual outperforms the
chosen investment, even when the investment performs
better than expected. In this experiment we focus more
directly on the counterfactual comparison process and ask
half of our subjects to make this comparison before we
ask them to indicate their emotional response. If our rea-
soning holds, subjects that are probed to make counter-
factual comparisons will show results similar to the max-
imizers in the previous experiment. For the subjects that
are not probed to make counterfactual comparisons we
expect to find that regret is only high when the chosen
investment performs worse than expected.
Experiment 5 makes another contribution. We also ex-
amine the effects of expectation and counterfactual prob-
ing on disappointment. We expect that disappointment is
affected only by expectation, and not by the counterfac-
tual comparison with the outcome of a different choice.
Finally, this study was run in The Netherlands, in the
Dutch language and with Dutch students as subjects, al-
lowing us to ask whether the effect of expectation on re-
gret can also be found in another culture.
6.1 Method
One hundred and fifty nine students at Fontys University
in Tilburg (76 males, 83 females, Mage = 20.48, SD =
3.52) participated voluntarily and received 5 euro in re-
turn. They were randomly assigned to one of 4 conditions
of the 2 (Expectation: Above vs. Below) × 2 (Counterfac-
tual Probing: No vs. Yes) design. Subjects read the sce-
nario from Experiment 1, with the exception that it dealt
with the Asian funds AQT and BXA.
Subjects in the Probing Counterfactual condition were
asked to write down the amount of profit they had made
with their investment in AQT, and were also asked to
write down how much more profit they would have ob-
tained had they invested in BXA. After this, subjects in-
dicated on two single items how much regret they felt
over choosing to invest in AQT and how disappointed
they were in the outcome of their investment (0= not at
all; 10 = very much). Subjects in the NO Probing condi-
tion did not receive the profit questions and responded to
the regret and disappointment question immediately after
reading the scenario.
6.2 Results and discussion
The results are shown in Figure 5. A 2 (Expectation:
Above vs. Below) × 2 (Counterfactual Probing: No vs.
Yes) ANOVA on the regret ratings yielded significant
main effects of expectation (Mabove = 4.84 vs. Mbelow =
5.89, F (1, 155) = 7.99, p < .01) and Counterfactual Prob-
ing (Mno probing = 4.82 vs. Mprobing = 5.91, F (1, 155) =
8.62, p < .01. The interaction is not significant, F (1,
155) = 2.03, p = .16.
Although the interaction did not reach significance, the
simple main effects analysis revealed that for subjects
who were not probed we replicated the earlier findings.
Regret was significantly lower when the investment out-
comes were above expectations (M = 4.03, SD = 2.28)
than below expectations (M = 5.61, SD = 2.29), F (1,
155) = 9.13, p < .01. However, this difference disappears
when subjects that were probed to compare counterfac-
tuals (Mabove = 5.65, SD = 2.20; Mbelow = 6.17, SD =
2.53), F (1, 155) = .98, p = .33. That is, when explicitly
asked to compare the investment outcome to the counter-
factual investment, regret ratings are high regardless of
the levels of expectation. This finding replicates the find-
ing for maximizers that we obtained in Experiment 4, but
now more directly shows that it is due to comparison pro-
cesses.
The ANOVA on the disappointment ratings yielded
only a significant main effect of expectation, F (1, 155)
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= 71.42, p < .001. The Counterfactual Probing main ef-
fect and the interaction were non significant, F’s (1, 155)
= 0.48, p’s < .49. The subjects were more disappointed
when the investment yielded a profit below expectation
(M = 5.83, SD = 2.23), than when it was above expec-
tation (M = 2.96, SD = 2.00). Note that in also when
the obtained outcome was above expectations, the non-
chosen investment was even better. The disappointment
ratings thus were unaffected by the counterfactual com-
parison with outcome of the non-chosen investment, and
only affected by how the obtained outcome compared to
the expectation.
7 General discussion
Regret is rooted in a comparison of actual decision out-
comes with counterfactual outcomes. In this study, we
used this observation to gain more insight into the com-
parison process underlying regret. In particular, we ex-
plored the role of expectation in moderating the effect of
the forgone outcome on the judgments of post-decisional
regret. Based on extensive past research, we assumed
that, when outcomes exceed expectations, people are less
likely to think through the consequences of the better-
performing forgone outcomes, and this failure prevents
them from experiencing regret. Conversely, when out-
comes fall below expectations or expectations are absent,
people engage in counterfactual thinking of what could
have been, and thus suffer from regret.
This hypothesis was supported by the results of five ex-
perimental studies. Our results showed that subjects with
unfavorable outcomes (the obtained outcome is worse
than the forgone one) tended to report less regret when
outcomes were above expectations than below expecta-
tions or no expectation—either in a win (Experiments
1, 3, and 4) or loss (Experiment 2) situation. This hy-
pothesis was also supported in a large forgone gain sit-
uation (Experiment 3): when outcomes exceeded ex-
pectations, subjects indicated less regret about their un-
favorable outcomes regardless of the magnitude of the
missed gain. However, when outcomes fell below expec-
tations, subjects expressed more regret when they missed
out on a much better investment (e.g., NT$400,000) than
when they missed out on only a slightly better one (e.g.,
NT$200,000). Experiment 5 further reveals that when
subjects are probed to make counterfactual comparisons,
investments that exceed expectations also lead to regret.
Lin et al. (2006) were the first to show that expecta-
tion is related to regret (see also, Huang & Tseng, 2007).
Our findings expand this insight in three important ways.
First, our data are experimental instead of correlational,
allowing for causal conclusions to be drawn. Second,
we provided five replications of the effect of expecta-
tions, showing the robustness of the effect. Third, and
psychologically most interesting, our data reveal inter-
esting knowledge about the underlying process. The ex-
perimental data clearly show that the comparison process
that takes place when people judge their post-decisional
regrets is moderated by expectations and individual dif-
ferences in maximization.
We are not the first to theorize on the role of poten-
tial moderators regarding counterfactual outcomes and
regret. For example, Van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2005)
demonstrated that uncertainty about counterfactual out-
comes, and incomparability of counterfactual and factual
outcomes were factors that moderated comparison pro-
cess of eliciting regret. The current study examined from
a different angle how the effect of the might have been
outcome on the experienced regret was strongly moder-
ated by the expectations. Subjects used the violation of
their expectations as a criterion for comparing relative
performance of the different investment options. This
behavior may be an advantage because it might protect
people from experiencing regret. Regret threatens peo-
ple’s self-image because it can lead them to question the
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wisdom of their original decision (Larrick, 1993). People
can escape regret by thinking positively about what has
happened (e.g., I earned as much as I expected) rather
than what could have happened. This protects their self-
images and sense of personal well-being. This conclu-
sion is consistent with the claim made by Loewenstein
and Lerner (2003, p. 624): “People care not only about
the relative outcomes of a decision but also about what
the chosen outcome implies for their own self-evaluation
as a competent, intelligent person.”
In addition, although many studies have documented
that regret and disappointment are independent of each
other (e.g., Bell, 1985; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004; Zee-
lenberg et al., 1998), Loomes and Sugden (1987, 1988)
suggested the possibility that people make both compar-
isons. They claimed that “under certain circumstances we
might expect regret and disappointment to occur simulta-
neously: they may be complementary rather than mutu-
ally exclusive” (Loomes & Sugden, 1987, p. 120). More
recently, Yi and Baumgartner (2004) concluded that re-
gret experiences are sometimes accompanied by negative
disconfirmation regarding a chosen alternative; regret and
disappointment were positively correlated. Our results in
the present study are consistent with these conjectures of
multiple reference points.
An additional insight stems from the finding that the
effects of expectation are moderated by individual differ-
ences in the need to maximize (Schwartz et al., 2002).
Results from Experiment 4 show that maximizers are not
affected by how the obtained investment outcome relates
to the prior held expectation, but only by the comparison
with the outcome of the unchosen investment. Satisfi-
cers, however, look for something that is good enough
(that passes a threshold of acceptability). When an ob-
tained outcome exceeded expectation, satisficers felt less
regret because that outcome has crossed the threshold of
acceptability. For them, it is less necessary to regret a
bird in the hand to two in the bush. As far as we know,
this is the first demonstration of effects maximization on
the state of regret.
Interestingly, the findings concerning maximization
are compatible with other studies that reveal the role
played by personality in counterfactual thinking and ref-
erence point selection. For example, Kasimatis and Wells
(1995) found that individuals with high self-esteem tend
to select downward counterfactuals (e.g., a person with
a lower salary), while low self-esteem subjects tended
to select upward counterfactuals (e.g., a person with a
higher salary). Van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2005) found
that compared to those lower in social comparison ori-
entation (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999), subjects high in so-
cial comparison orientation engaged in social compar-
isons that produced regret, even if these turned out to
be difficult comparisons. Our findings that maximizers
tend to select the better-performing outcome as a com-
parison standard, while satisficers may initially select the
expectation as a comparison standard after decision mak-
ing also adds new insight to this literature.
Finally, we studied the role of prior expectancies on
the psychology of investor regret. This is especially use-
ful, since it has often been argued that regret is a crucial
emotion in the life of investors (e.g., Kahneman & Riepe,
1998, Shefrin & Statman, 1986). One may argue that
our study is limited by the fact that we used hypotheti-
cal scenarios, and that things may be different for actual
investors (Girotto et al., 2007; Fernandez-Duque &Lan-
ders, 2008). Even though we are sensitive to such com-
ments concerning the external validity of lab studies, we
note that our subjects all had personal experience with in-
vesting. Moreover, our studies were partly inspired by the
research of Lin et al. (2006) who found that regret was re-
lated to expectation, using a sample of real investors who
reflected about their own investments. We think that our
experimental studies, along with the survey of Lin et al.
provide strong evidence for the role of expectation in in-
vestor regret.
To sum up, while the forgone alternative has long been
the dominant focus in regret studies, our study contributes
considerably to the understanding of the powerful effects
of expectation and individual differences in maximiza-
tion on the post-decisional comparison processes regard-
ing regret.
References
Bell, D. E. (1985). Disappointment in decision making
under uncertainty. Operations Research, 33, 1–27.
Boles, T. L., & Messick, D. M. (1995). A reverse out-
come bias: The influence of multiple reference points
on the evaluation of outcomes and decisions. Organi-
zational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 61,
262–275.
Bridges, E. (1993). Service attributes: Expectations and
judgments. Psychology and Marketing, 10, 185–197.
Cherry, B., Ordóñez, L. D., & Gilliland, S. W. (2003).
Grade expectations: The effects of expectations on
fairness and satisfaction perceptions. Journal of Be-
havioral Decision Making, 16, 375–295.
Fernandez-Duquet, D., & Landers, J. (2008). “Feeling
more regret than I would have imagined”: Self-report
and behavioural evidence. Judgment and Decision
Making, 3, 449–456.
Gibbons, F. X., & Buunk, B. P. (1999). Individual dif-
ferences in social comparison: Development and vali-
dation of a measure of social comparison orientation.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 129–
142.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 7, No. 4, July 2012 Expectation and regret 450
Girotto, V., Ferrante, D., Pighin, S., & Gonzalez, M.
(2007) Post-decisional counterfactual thinking by ac-
tors and readers. Psychological Science, 18, 510–515.
Huang, W.-H., & Tseng, L.-J., (2007). How multiple ref-
erence points influence managers’ post-decisional re-
gret. Social Behavior and Personality, 35, 487–498.
Inman, J. J. (2007). Regret regulation: Disentangling
self-reproach from learning. Journal of Consumer Psy-
chology, 17, 19–24.
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986). Norm theory:
Comparing reality to its alternatives. Psychological
Review, 93, 136–153.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky A. (1979). Prospect theory:
An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47,
263–391.
Kahneman, D., & Riepe, M. (1998). Aspects of investor
psychology. The Journal of Portfolio Management, 24,
52–65.
Kasimatis, M., & Wells, G. L. (1995). Individual differ-
ences in counterfactual thinking. In N. J. Roese & J. M.
Olson (Eds.). What might have been: The social psy-
chology of counterfactual thinking, pp. 81–101. Mah-
wah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Larrick, R. P. (1993). Motivational factors in decision
theories: The role of self-protection. Psychological
Bulletin, 113, 440–450.
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1987). Testing for regret and
disappointment in choice under uncertainty. The Eco-
nomic Journal, 97, 118–129.
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1988). The impact of regret
and disappointment. Economica, 55, 47–62.
Lin, C.-H., Huang, W.-H., & Zeelenberg, M. (2006).
Multiple reference points in investor regret. Journal
of Economic Psychology, 27, 781–792.
Loewenstein, G., & Lerner, J. S. (2003). The role of
affect in decision making. In R. Davidson, H. Gold-
smith, & K. Scherer (Eds.), Handbook of affective sci-
ence (pp. 619–642). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mandel, D. R. (2003). Counterfactuals, emotions, and
context. Cognition and Emotion, 17, 139–159.
Marcatto, F., & Ferrante, D. (2008). The regret and dis-
appointment scale: An instrument for assessing regret
and disappointment in decision making. Judgment and
Decision Making, 3, 87–99.
McGraw, A. P., Mellers, B. A., & Tetlock, P. E. (2005).
Expectations and emotions of Olympic athletes. Jour-
nal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41, 438–446.
Mellers, B. A., Schwartz, A., Ho, K., & Ritov, I. (1997).
Decision affect theory: Emotional reactions to the out-
comes of risky options. Psychological Science, 8, 423–
449.
Morrison, M., & Roese, N. J. (2011). Regrets of the typ-
ical American: Findings from a nationally representa-
tive sample. Social Psychological and Personality Sci-
ence, 2, 576–583.
Oliver, R. L. (1996). Satisfaction: A behavioral perspec-
tive on the consumer. McGraw-Hill, New York, NY.
Ordóñez, L. D., Connolly, T., & Coughlan, R. (2000).
Multiple reference points in satisfaction and fairness
assessment. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making,
13, 329–344.
Pieters, R., & Zeelenberg, M. (2007). A theory of regret
regulation 1.1. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 17,
29–35.
Raeva, D., Van Dijk, E., & Zeelenberg, M. (2011). How
comparing decision outcomes affects subsequent deci-
sions: The carry-over of a comparative mind-set. Judg-
ment and Decision Making, 6, 342–349.
Ritov, I. (2000). The role of expectations in comparison.
Psychological Review, 107, 345–357.
Roese, N. J., & Olson, J. M. (1997). Counterfactual
thinking: The intersection of affect and function. Ad-
vances in Experimental Social Psychology, 29, 1–59.
Roese, N. J., Summerville, A., & Fessel, F. (2007).
Regret and behavior: Comment on Zeelenberg and
Pieters. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 17, 25–28.
Sanna, L. J., & Turley, K. J. (1996). Antecedents to spon-
taneous counterfactual thinking: Effects of expectancy
violation and outcome valence. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 22, 906–919.
Schwartz, B., Ward, A., Monterosso, J., Lyubomirsky, S.,
White, K., & Lehman, D. R. (2002). Maximizing ver-
sus satisficing: Happiness is a matter of choice. Jour-
nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 1178–
1197.
Shefrin, H. M., & Statman, M. (1986). How not to make
money in the stock market. Psychology Today, Febru-
ary, 52–57.
Tsiros, M., & Mittal, V. (2000). Regret: A model of
its antecedents and consequences in consumer decision
making. Journal of Consumer Research, 26, 401–417.
Van Dijk, E., & Zeelenberg, M. (2005). On the psychol-
ogy of “if only”: Regret and the comparison between
factual and counterfactual outcomes. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 97, 152–
160.
Van Dijk, W. W., & Van der Pligt, J. (1997). The im-
pact of probability and magnitude of outcome on dis-
appointment and elation. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 69, 277–284.
Västfjäll, D., Peters, E., & Bjälkebring, P. (2011). The
Experience and Regulation of Regret Across the Adult
Life Span. In: In, I. Nyklíček, A. J. J. M. Vingerhoets,
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